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Who remembers Chechnya now? Who cares? When the first post-Soviet Russo-Chechen 
War raged between 1994 and 1996, the world’s public opinion usually saw Chechen 
guerillas as freedom fighters. Less than three years before the outbreak of this conflict 
the Soviet Union had broken up and its union republics were transformed into or 
recreated as ethnolinguistically defined independent nation-states. Meanwhile, within the 
Russian Federation most of its autonomous republics and regions declared and 
demanded recognition of their sovereignty at the turn of the 1990s. This heady period 
became known as a ‘festival of independence.’ Tatarstan is still hailed (though without 
much substance to this end) as the most independent out of all Russia’s autonomous 
republics, but none dared to declare independence. That is, none but Chechnya. In 1991 
an independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Nóxçiyn Paçẋalq Içkeri in Chechen) was 
founded, leading to the split of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic. In the Chechen Republic, Cyrillic was replaced by Latin letters for writing the 
Chechen language in emulation of the Turkish example. The Ingushes cautiously decided 
that their autonomous Republic of Ingushetia should remain in Russia. They were right. 
In the wake of what the incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin sees as ‘the 
greatest geopolitical tragedy’ of the 20th century (that is, the breakup of the SU), the 
Kremlin de facto steeled itself not to let a single piece of territory leave the boundaries 
of what had been the SU’s largest union republic, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic, which in turn yielded the post-Soviet polity of the Russian Federation. This 
approach became the proverbial ‘red thin line’ one would not be allowed to cross; the 
post-Soviet Russian government would not tolerate the independence of Chechnya. The 
fatigue of the disastrous Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979-1989) not yet over, as vividly 
chronicled by the 2015 Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich in her Boys in Zinc (1991), a 
new catastrophe struck both Chechnya’s civilian population and families across Russia as 
                                                          
1 I warmly thank Catherine Gibson for her invaluable suggestions for improvement. Obviously I am alone responsible for any 
remaining infelicities. 
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their sons were conscripted to the army for compulsory military service and then sent to 
kill and die in another neocolonial war. 
 
Urban warfare conducted with tanks, helicopters and bombers (akin to what is now 
observed in Syria) engendered a wave of over half a million of refugees from the 
republic’s population of just a million. The deaths of numerous civilians and conscripts, 
‘cleansing operations’ (zachistka), ‘filtration camps’ (fil'tratsionnyi lager'), and wanton 
destruction appalled public opinion in Russia and internationally. The Russian 
government was criticized en masse by the western world and - now a rare sight - by 
Russian citizens. Apart from turning into a military stalemate, this conflict was an awful 
public image disaster for the faltering Boris Yeltsin administration. The successful 1996 
assassination of Ichekria’s first President and the only Red Army general of Chechen 
extraction, Dzhokhar Dudayev (Dƶoxar Dudin), did not help. In his honor the defiant 
Chechens renamed their capital of Grozny as Dƶovxar-Ġala, or the City of Dzhokhar. It 
was high time to try something else. The Kremlin called upon services of the charismatic 
anti-establishment Soviet-Afghan war veteran, General Alexander Lebed, who had 
already proved his credentials by achieving a much needed truce in the Transnistrian 
War (instigated by Russia against Moldova) that limited the final toll to a thousand 
casualties. Chechen fighters placed great trust in a former fellow Red Army soldier than 
apparatchiks-turned-democrats in distant Moscow. In the summer of 1996 Lebed 
negotiated an agreement with Ichkeria’s new President Aslan Maskhadov effectively 
ending the war. The following year Yeltsin and Maskhadov formally signed this 
agreement at Moscow. To a degree, the Russian government recognized the 
independence of Ichkeria and promised to end the use of violence associated with the 
on-and-off Russo-Chechen conflict fought for over three centuries. A new opening for 
better, equitable and – most importantly – peaceful relations between the Chechens and 
Russia was a clear possibility. 
 
Meanwhile, Chechen refugees were accepted and given asylum across Europe, including 
in numerous post-communist and post-Soviet states. Streets and squares were named 
across these countries in honor of Dudayev, and numerous plaques and monuments 
were erected to his memory and to the bravery of Chechen independence fighters. It 
appeared that a stable peace had been achieved in Ichkeria and this newly independent 
postcolonial state would gradually gain internationally recognized independence. But two 
years later, in 1999, rogue Chechen forces invaded the neighboring autonomous 
Republic of Dagestan. Russia replied with full military might, facilitated by the rapid 
growth of the oil price, which began in this year and continued unabated for the entire 
decade. In her diary, Polina Zherebtsova saw the retributive shelling of Dzhokhar 
(Grozny) as another, that is, ‘second’ Russo-Chechen War. However, these events 
hardly registered on the radar of world public opinion. On the other hand, the further 
forays of rogue Chechen forces outside Chechnya, bent on bringing the war to Russia, 
convinced many international commentators that Chechen fighters were none other than 
feared ‘Islamist terrorists.’ This change in the outside perception of the Chechen military 
from ‘freedom fighters’ to ‘terrorists’ was sealed by Al-Qaeda’s 2001 attack on the US 
and the 2004 school siege conducted by rogue Chechen fighters in the North Ossetian 
town of Beslan, which cost over 300 children their lives. The former event triggered 
3 
 
Washington’s ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the latter turned even 
Russia’s few remaining liberals against the Chechens and their cause. 
 
Paradoxically, the 1999 Dagestan raid played into the Kremlin’s hands. First, it allowed 
the Russian government to nullify the 1997 Russo-Chechen peace treaty, which some 
considered a ‘humiliation’ for resurgent Russia. Second, this raid facilitated the transition 
of power from ailing Yeltsin to the largely unknown and uncharismatic former KGB 
officer, Vladimir Putin. In August 1999 President Yeltsin nominated Putin as his Prime 
Minister. In addition, the latter’s legitimacy as a potential contender for Russian 
presidency was given a boost when Putin oversaw the inconclusive investigation of the 
bombings of apartment blocks that killed almost 300 people later that year in Buynaksk, 
Moscow and Volgodonsk. Conveniently, Chechen ‘terrorists’ were accused of planting the 
explosives, so Prime Minister Putin could have a ‘reason’ to order yet more aerial 
bombing raids on Dzhokhar (Grozny). However, some allege that it was the Russian 
security forces, the FSB (the KGB’s successor), who actually staged these attacks. The 
perpetrators remain unknown to this day. A rapid swell in popularity allowed Putin to win 
the presidential election in 2000. General Lebed who had quite successfully participated 
in the earlier presidential election of 1996 must have been strongly warned to step 
aside. He contented himself with the then still elected position of the Governor of 
Krasnoiarsk Krai. 
 
Meanwhile, Russian aerial bombing attacks on Chechnya led to the outbreak of another 
conflict that officially became known as the Second Russo-Chechen War (though to 
Zherebtsova’s keen observing eye it was already the third war she had experienced in 
her home city). It was destined to be even more violent, intensive and protracted than 
the first one. In Ichkeria a kind of dual administration set in. Moscow controlled the 
urbanized parts of Chechnya, while the Chechen government and fighters ruled supreme 
in the mountains and hard-to-reach mountain villages. Enthusiasm for this war waned 
quickly in Russia when more zinc coffins came back to Moscow with corpses of eighteen-
year-old conscripts. Accordingly, Putin’s popularity began to dip in the polls. The 
charismatic Lebed again offered his services, but died in 2002 in a helicopter crash (or 
was it assassination?). Ichkeria’s governmental institutions de facto ceased operating in 
2000. The country’s government went into exile and was discontinued in 2007 when the 
last Ichkerian president proclaimed a Caucasus Emirate, with Ichkeria as its province. 
Meanwhile, the west had fully embraced Putin as a ‘fellow democrat and trusted ally’ in 
the Washington-led ‘war on terror.’ The radicalization of some segments of the Chechen 
forces who turned to Al-Qaeda and its form of militant Islam seemed to prove that the 
west was right in striking such a ‘working coalition’ with Putin’s Russia. 
 
In 2005 the FSB assassinated the moderate Ichkerian President Maskhadov, pushing 
control over the Chechen fighters into the hands of increasingly more radical 
commanders, often epitomized by the iconic Shamil Basayev. FSB officers assassinated 
him a year later. Symptomatically, also in 2006, the investigative journalist Anna 
Politkovskaya was assassinated when entering the elevator in the apartment block 
where she lived in Moscow. To this days the murderers have not been identified. 
Politkovskaya was an increasingly lone voice of liberal Russia, criticizing the sheer 
violence and brutality of Russia’s home-made ‘war on terror’ in Chechnya, in which 
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every Chechen man, woman and child were treated as ‘terrorists.’ Her two books on this 
subject – A Dirty War (2001) and A Small Corner of Hell (2003) – were a timely 
reminder about what democracy and human rights should be about, and what demons 
their absence may spawn. But the wave of ‘the accepted narrative’ turned. The west 
preferred not to see or hear what was going on in Chechnya, while Russia’s population 
enjoyed the golden decade of high oil prices that boosted standards of living and the 
government’s popularity ratings. Yeltsin died in 2007, leaving Putin in charge of Russia 
as the country’s undisputed leader. After the 2009 winding down of the wide-scale 
military operations in Chechnya, the war was declared over. The first President of the 
pro-Russian Chechen Republic, Akhmad Kadyrov, installed by Moscow in 2003, was 
assassinated a year later. Putin could not automatically make Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, 
into another Chechen president because he was not yet 30, the legal age threshold for 
assuming this office. But Kadyrov junior was eased into the republic’s positions of power 
in quick succession as Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Chechnya, before 
assuming the post of the republic’s President in 2007. In this way, thanks to the well-
established loyal Kadyrov dynasty, the Kremlin could at long last be rid of having to be 
directly involved in exercising the Weberian monopoly of power for the sake of keeping 
uneasy stability in the restive republic. In turn, Kadyrov’s battle-hardened Chechen 
bodyguards and the republic’s security forces (known collectively as kadyrovtsy) could 
be deployed elsewhere in Russia when it was necessary to teach ‘unruly inhabitants’ a 
lesson, or when a ‘disloyal individual’ had to be liquidated. Simultaneously, non-
transparent transfers of huge financial outlays for the reconstruction of Chechnya 
spawned a secretive kleptocratic system of kick-backs that enriched Kadyrov and his 
loyalists, alongside his Kremlin superiors. Grozny, formerly reduced to rubble, was 
quickly rebuilt as a pro-Russian city, its character strangely defined through a blend of 
state-approved Islam and postmodern buildings. The old Soviet homely multicultural and 
somewhat shoddy Grozny and the ruins of Dzhokhar were gone. 
 
The Chechen War now over, who is there – apart from families – to shed a tear or 
remember the 200,000 to 300,000 casualties out of the republic’s total population of 1 
million? The west continued to turn a blind eye to the unpalatable genocidal-like reality 
of the Chechen conflict and its aftermath until the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and even 
till 2014, when Putin’s Russia attacked annexed Ukraine’s Crimea. This time the 
resurgent Russian Federation crossed a thin red line, breaching one of the foundational 
principles of peace and stability in postwar Europe as enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords, namely, the inviolability of the existing European borders. To add insult to 
injury, the Kremlin also seized Ukraine’s eastern provinces and from this base keeps 
waging war on this country. For a while, the west was appalled, but the occupation of 
Crimea and the war in Ukraine were quickly forgotten, when in another rapid move on 
the geopolitical chessboard, Russia intervened in 2016 in the stalemated Syrian Civil 
War, decisively tipping the balance in favor of the Assad regime. In Britain television 
news bulletins have not failed to mention the Syrian War and Russia’s involvement 
almost every day for the last two years. To the contrary, the continuing Russo-Ukrainian 
War and the Russian occupation of Crimea are rarely mentioned, while the Chechen 
Wars and their aftermath never make it to the news. Ukraine and Chechnya seem to lie 
farther away from Britain than Syria. But in reality the distance, as the crow flies, from 
London to Damascus is 3,500 kilometers, while only 2,500 kilometers between the 
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British capital and Crimea, 2,700 kilometers between it and the Russian-occupied 
eastern Ukraine, or 3,000 kilometers between London and Chechnya. 
 
Polina Zherebtsova’s childhood-cum-adolescence diary and Irena Brežná’s collection of 
reportages offer a stark insight from the all too rarely evoked female perspective into 
the grassroots realities of both Chechen wars and their aftermath. They reflect on the 
sheer human cost of geopolitical decisions and power calculations conducted in distant 
capitals, with little or no respect for the lives of civilians, or for that matter of soldiers 
and fighters, either. The successful transfer of power in Russia took precedence over 
such trifle considerations. The west conceded as long as Russia was needed as a trusted 
partner in the ‘war on terror,’ and only started crying wolf , rather quietly,after 2014. 
Cheap Russian oil and gas stifle it well. In the west’s eyes, the war in Syria seems to be 
of more import on account of the country’s proximity to the Middle Eastern seams of oil 
and to Israel. Somehow, the ongoing Brexit negotiations make the British elite forgetful 
of the fact that the European Union borders both on Ukraine and Russia, not on Syria or 
Israel. Symptomatically, both books under review were published in German, French, or 
Czech, but not in English. (Furthermore, She-Wolves from Sernovodsk also appeared in 
Italian and Slovak editions, while Ant in a Glass Jar was published in Bulgarian, Finnish, 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian too.) Thus far, neither of these two titles has had a 
chance to make a dent in the absent memory of the two Chechen wars and their victims, 
a forgetfulness that is especially pronounced in the Anglophone world. Somehow, 
readers and publishers prefer the male fighter’s point of view as evidenced by the 2013 
bestselling volume, Mikail Eldin’s The Sky Wept Fire: My Life as a Chechen Freedom 
Fighter, that ironically was translated from the Russian, though never published in 
Russia. In 2017 Chechnya briefly returned to the news when Kadyrov ordered a 
crackdown on gays in, literally, his republic, because in the Islamic nation of Chechens 
‘homosexuality did not, does not and cannot exist.’ 
 
Unsurprisingly, postwar Chechnya is characterized by heightened patriarchalism. These 
are the real-life gendered effects of both wars, as Brežná acutely observes in her book’s 
closing reportage from 2012 (she added more recent material to the Slovak-language 
version of the 1997 German edition of this volume.) Present-day Chechen society is 
male-centered, ritualized displays of physical prowess need to be accompanied by arms 
and, ideally, one should be a member of the Chechen police, army or security forces. 
Other forms of gainful employment are scarce in the republic. What remains for others is 
to move to Moscow or anther Russian city for work, despite the fact that they are often 
face there much racist discrimination and exploitation, and are offensively dubbed bu 
ethnic Russian racists as ‘black-assed Caucasians’ (kavkazskiie chornozhoptsy). In a 
deftly legitimizing bow to traditional Islam, many women in Chechnya wear the Islamic 
headscarf or even the veil, and tend to keep to designed female-only spaces, as required 
by this religion. It is a far cry from the equality of genders as promoted and actually 
implemented during the Soviet times. This equality was even exacerbated in the course 
of the war when women could and did enter many places that became no-go areas to 
Chechen males, by default suspected of being enemy fighters. It was Chechen women 
who pleaded with Russian officers for the lives of their menfolk. Women travelled 
unaccompanied across the length and breadth of Ichkeria and Russia in search of their 
sons and husbands incarcerated in black prisons or concentration (‘filtration’) camps. 
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Alternatively, when the latter turned out to be already dead, some Chechen women, in 
despair, took revenge on Russians, by turning themselves into suicide bombers. They 
became known in the western press as ‘black widows,’ carrying out attacks mainly 
between 2000 and 2013. 
 
Irena Brežná is a renowned Swiss journalist of Slovak origin who covered the Chechen 
Wars for the German-speaking press, including the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. She is finely 
attuned to the fate of refugees and emigrants, as her family fled Czechoslovakia in the 
wake of the Prague Spring in 1968 when the Warsaw Pact’s intervention was already 
under way. Thanks to her fluency in Slovak and Czech, Brežná faced no problems with 
acquiring Russian, which was a compulsory school subject in communist Czechoslovakia. 
In Switzerland she graduated from the University of Basel in Slavic studies, psychology 
and philosophy. This personal and educational background equipped her for the career 
of a translator and psychologist working mainly with refugees. Brežná has also been 
active in Amnesty International and, as a convinced feminist, led women-empowering 
projects in Guinea, Chechnya and some postcommunist countries. Not surprisingly, her 
perfectly crafted sparse prose borders on poetic and allows Brežná to effectively convey 
the tragedy of war as observed through a woman’s eyes. As much as her skills allowed 
her to cross the previously iron-clad boundaries between a variety of professional 
careers, academic jobs, or languages, these also let her see more than met the typically 
male war correspondent’s gaze. Brežná moved further and deeper than Politkovskaya in 
probing the realities of the Chechen wars. Rather than to stun security personnel with 
her audacity, as the latter did, Brežná chose to blend in, strove to fall under the FSB’s 
radar. For the purpose of participatory observation she joined a group of Chechen 
women and saw for herself what Russian troops did. In the opening reportage, after the 
spa village of Sernovodsk (on the Ingush border) was ‘cleansed’ of fighters following a 
week-long siege, the locality’s women, with Brežná disguised as one of them, were 
permitted to re-enter their houses in order to salvage some movable property. What 
they (and Brežná) saw was wanton destruction: crockery and furniture broken, living 
rooms defiled, food spoiled, livestock killed or wounded and left to putrefy, clothes slit 
and trodden into the slush, a copy of the Quran thrown into a muddy yard. 
 
Contrary to official declarations on the radio, television or in the leaflets scattered from 
airplanes, the federal soldiers did not protect or respect peaceful civilian populations. As 
vividly evidenced by Zherebtsova’s diary, irrespective of their actual intentions or ethnic 
background, all Grozny inhabitants were treated as potential enemy combatants, from 
children to the elderly. Girls and women often suffered sexual violence. Likewise, 
everyone’s property was loot to which Russian soldiers readily helped themselves, often 
because they lacked essentials; superiors commonly misappropriated conscripts’ pay 
and sold their food and armaments on the black market. Chechen fighters bought such 
supplies at highly reduced prices, so the war could continue unabated. Arguably, fate 
dealt the worst hand to city dwellers, where bombings, mortar fire and tanks killed them 
indiscriminately on an industrial scale. Neither civilian status nor a non-Chechen 
ethnicity was of import. Soldiers did not check any IDs, but shot first, fearful lest 
Chechen fighters might get them. The Russian army learned and perfected methods of 
modern urban warfare in densely populated areas during these two Chechen wars. Now 
the Kremlin shares this expertise with Bashar al-Assad in Syria. 
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Nevertheless in Grozny, under Russian siege for months during the first war and for 
years during the second, life continued. Those without money or relatives elsewhere in 
Russia had no other choice but to stay. Bus convoys with refugees leaving the city were 
frequently attacked both by federal troops and Chechen fighters. To civilians it was 
another proof that paradoxically, it might be safer to remain in this city under fire than 
try to leave as refugees. Incredibly, Polina Zherebtsova lived under these near-lethal 
conditions through both the Chechen wars. When the first war broke out in 1994 she 
was just nine and decided to write a diary, perhaps, in order to deal with this everyday 
trauma. She continued her diary for a decade through 2004 when the second war was 
largely over and Ramzan Kadyrov commenced the process of taking over the republic 
after the assassination of his father. At over 600 densely printed pages, Zherebtsova left 
a haunting document. She is the Anna Frank of Russia’s genocidal-like war on Chechnya. 
All who want to know can now see through her child’s and teenager’s eyes how 
unprecedentedly brutal this warfare was, sparing no one, not even children. First power 
and water went. Electric lighting was replaced with candles and makeshift kerosene 
lamps, a frequent cause of devastating fires. Water had to be hoisted from the 
remaining few public pumps and later into the war cistern trucks brought it from the 
nearby lakes and rivers. One had to pay for this hardly potable muddy liquid mixed with 
weeds and sand. Gastric ailments and epidemics plagued the city’s population. Then 
hunger struck. Those without money or family connections in the countryside, like Polina 
and her mother, never had enough to eat. Malnutrition lasting for years on end became 
a new norm, in extreme cases leading to death by starvation. 
 
During the first war, Polina’s sick grandfather Anatolii, a bibliophile and cinema 
projectionist, died in a hospital destroyed by shelling. The second war literally razed the 
apartment block where she used to live with her mother, and almost killed Polina herself 
when a shell landed in the open-air market where she sold books at a stall for a living. 
Killing became casual and abandoned corpses were left to putrefy in most unlikely 
places. Zherebtsova’s family is multiethnic, but her surname is Russian-sounding, so 
when she was attending elementary school during and after the first war, Chechen 
children gave her hard time. Prejudice against ethnic Russians was at its highest then 
and ‘kill Russians’ became a new oft-uttered curse and threat. The war polarized 
Grozny’s inhabitants into Chechens who bravely defended their land and lives and 
Russian ‘infidel attackers.’ Whenever non-Chechens could they left the city or were 
hounded by Chechen neighbors to leave. Vacated apartments were readily stolen or 
bought for a pittance from scared Russians and other non-Muslims. Those who stayed 
put were often killed. Russians and other non-Chechens who left Grozny were promptly 
replaced with Chechens fleeing rural poverty or indiscriminate ‘cleansing’ operations 
carried out by federal troops. The city’s population plummeted by 60 percent from 
400,000 in 1991 to 186,000 in 1996, and after the postwar decade lamely bounced back 
to a mere 290,000 in 2017. Nowadays, ethnic Chechens account for almost 94 per cent 
of the inhabitants, though in 1989 they amounted to 30 percent, while ethnic Russians 
constituted 53 percent of Grozny’s prewar population. 
 
Non-Chechens or children from ethnically mixed families, like Polina, who remained in 
the city had to polish their command of the Chechen language to blend in. For this 
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purpose they also needed to start practising some Chechen customs, especially those 
dictated by Islam in relation to headscarves and long frocks for girls and women. The 
prewar tradition of forming friendships and cohesive neighborhoods with no regard for 
one’s ethnic background came handy. Most of Grozny’s inhabitants were polyglot and 
multicultural, skilled at switching between an array of languages and customs when a 
need or circumstance dictated. Unfortunately, one’s name or surname could be an 
immediate give-away, even when it masked one’s true ethnic loyalty. War is black and 
white. Combatants do not need any complications when a bomb must be dropped or the 
trigger pulled. In the midst of this madness of warfare and ongoing ethnic cleansing, 
Polina persevered in attending school, buoyed by her diary, love of literature and books, 
both in Russian and Chechen. When her girlfriends as young as 13 or 14 were married 
off, in line with the rural Chechen tradition, she stuck to education, despite other 
teenagers’ scorn for her ‘stupidity.’ And much to her mother’s chagrin, because a young 
Chechen husband could better provide for her in this horrific situation. Zherebtsova 
evaded numerous attempts at forced elopement and marriage, continued to attend her 
elementary and secondary schools, worked on the market and as a nanny, and finally 
graduated with flying colors from the Chechen State Pedagogical Institute in 2004. 
During her university years Zherebtsova began publishing stories and poems, and 
worked as a journalist in local newspapers. Finally, in 2005, after having secured a 
pittance of a compensation for their destroyed apartment, she could leave with her mum 
for the relative safety of Stavropol, just north of Chechnya. In this Russian city 
Zherebtsova enrolled at the North Caucasus Federal University and graduated with a 
degree in psychology. Quite tellingly, in this respect her educational background 
overlaps with Irena Brežná’s. 
 
The publication of Polina Zherebtsova’s diary is a unique must-read first-hand witness 
account of the Russo-Chechen wars. It is also a proof of a certain respect for the 
freedom of speech in Russia’s managed illiberal democracy, though it does not extend to 
protecting controversial books’ authors, as amply evidenced by the assassination of 
Politkovskaya. Facing repeated death threats from ‘Russian patriots’ because of the war 
crimes she described in her diary and for being an outspoken of current Russian politics, 
in 2012 Zherebtsova had to flee to Finland, where she was granted asylum a year later. 
In 2017, Zherebtsova obtained Finnish citizenship and continues writing stories inspired 
by her tragic childhood and coming of age in war-torn Grozny. The fact that her safety 
could not be ensured in Russia is a clear proof of the final disappearance of the country’s 
liberals as a political force, however slim. For whatever one may want to criticize 
President Putin, the wide consensus in today’s Russia is that he was right to annex 
‘Russian’ Crimea. In 2015 Zherebtsova crossed this new thin red line when in an 
interview given to Radio Liberty she criticized the seizure of Crimea that breached 
international law and Russia’s present-day war on Ukraine. There is no return for her to 
Russia. This child victim of the two Russo-Chechen wars (so utterly forgotten in the 
west) became just another enemy of the Kremlin in its continuing ‘war on terror,’ and 
now additionally against ‘Ukrainian fascism.’ What counts is not facts, human rights, the 
rule of law, or decency, but solely the narrative that successfully boosts and maintains 
the legitimacy of the powers that be. 
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